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Abstract 
We applied the moral dissonance reduction framework, used to explain the maintenance of a positive 
self-concept in dishonest behavior, to understand self-justification of prejudice. Participants identified 
ambiguously negative intergroup behaviors, then evaluated those behaviors when performed by 
others and themselves. As predicted by moral dissonance reduction, participants were less critical of 
their own behavior when considering others' behaviors before their own. In a third study directly 
comparing prejudiced and dishonest behavior, participants' responses showed the greatest self-
justification in the initial question about their behavior regardless of the content of the question, 
whereas subsequent questions showed more stability, consistent with the idea that participants 
adjusted their initial self-reports to avoid damage to their self-concepts. 
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Consider the case of Valerie Smith, a candidate for village board in Southampton, New York. A reporter 
contacted Ms. Smith, who is White, regarding allegations that she used a racial slur in a complaint to 
the police about a group of Black men standing near her home. According to the reporter, 
Ms. Smith, 53, confirmed that she had made the call, and repeatedly used the "n-word" 
throughout a phone call with a reporter. On Friday, Ms. Smith said her use of the racial slur was 
no big deal, and she should be entitled to use it whenever she wants. She suggested that 
comedian Eddie Murphy made a career out of using the word, and added that she grew up 
hearing it on television in the 1970s show "All in the Family." "Now, all of a sudden, I can't use 
it?" Ms. Smith said in a phone interview on Friday. "Sorry—I live in a black neighborhood. I 
came here and didn't see color. ... When you are a pioneer, like I am, it's not easy. I'm the only 
white person who owns and lives on this street." (Wehner, [38]) 
How can we understand a person who says that using a racial slur is "no big deal" and who claims to be 
color-blind while describing her own race and the race of the people she is slurring? One possibility is 
that she is an overt, "old-fashioned" racist who is comfortable explicitly embracing the idea of White 
supremacy. Comfort with publicly expressing prejudice may be increased by information that social 
condemnation of prejudice has decreased, for example, through the election of a political candidate 
who makes derogatory statements about minority groups (Bursztyn, Egorov, & Fiorin, [ 4]). There has 
been a substantial increase in overtly prejudiced actions following the 2016 U.S. presidential election 
(Levin & Grisham, [21]; Southern Poverty Law Center, [35]), the most recent national election before 
Ms. Smith's remarks. However, Ms. Smith does not seem to be proudly proclaiming that she and other 
White people are superior to other races; rather, she seems puzzled about why her use of racial slurs is 
problematic and defensive about her motives. 
Another possibility is that Ms. Smith is expressing negative racial attitudes in a subtler way. If this is the 
case, she and others like her know that according to societal standards, it is a bad thing to be 
prejudiced. As a result of either social pressure or an internalized goal to avoid prejudice, their 
negative beliefs morph from a direct, old-fashioned expression to something different, such as an 
expression of political views that just happen to disadvantage certain racial groups or an exaggerated 
response to behaviors by members of that group. The idea that social condemnation can drive 
intergroup negativity underground is well supported; conceptions of racism that try to explain 
negativity combined with a reluctance to express that negativity overtly include modern racism 
(McConahay, [24]), aversive racism (Dovidio & Gaertner, [ 8]), ambivalent racism (Katz & Hass, [18]), 
and symbolic racism (Sears & Henry, [30]). Although these formulations differ in the way that 
negativity "leaks out" in judgments and interactions, and the degree to which majority group members 
sincerely desire to avoid prejudice, they share the perspective that people know that expressing overt 
prejudice will be socially condemned. These models, however, generally would not account for Ms. 
Smith's behavior; none of them address behavior such as using racial slurs, which is a fairly direct 
expression. 
A related potential explanation is that people like Ms. Smith do not know they have biases, because 
their biases are implicit. Implicit biases are negative evaluations of or behavioral tendencies toward 
outgroup members that by definition are inaccessible to introspection (Greenwald & Krieger, [17]; 
Greenwald & Banaji, [16]). This model shares the idea that negativity toward outgroup measures may 
be completely unintentional; it differs slightly in the role of individual motivation to avoid expressions 
of prejudice and bases in any specific moral or political stances. Instead, an individual learns passively 
from the environment and picks up unconscious attitudes and stereotypes. Negativity from implicit 
beliefs leaks into behavior in subtle ways (Pearson, Dovidio, & Gaertner, [25]) such as nonverbal 
behaviors and response latency (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, [ 9]). However, the kinds of 
statements made by Ms. Smith here are quite blatant, and although it is entirely possible that she 
holds implicit biases and that these biases help shape her behavior and decisions, what she is saying 
here has a definitionally explicit component. Unlike preconscious evaluations that might play a role in 
decision making under uncertainty and time pressure, Ms. Smith seems to have given this matter some 
considerable thought. In the same interview, she brags about the effectiveness of racial slurs in 
disbanding crowds of her neighbors ("'I said, 'You f— n—s!' and they just dispersed,' Ms. Smith 
recalled"; Wehner, [38]). 
Although there is strong research support for models explaining overt explicit prejudice, self-
presentational suppression of prejudiced responses, and leakage of implicit attitudes into behavior, 
Ms. Smith's behavior may best be understood using a different theoretical lens: She may be defining 
prejudice in a flexible and self-serving way. That is, in some cases people may define prejudice as 
something other than what they do, no matter what it is that they do, and no matter how many people 
would define what they do as prejudiced. Thus a person who refuses to hire members of a minority 
group can argue that he is not prejudiced because he doesn't use racial slurs, where racial slurs are the 
mark of real prejudice; a person who does use racial slurs instead defines prejudice as something else, 
perhaps refusing to hire someone based on race. If people successfully redefine prejudice in this way, 
they may be surprised and offended that anyone would accuse them of prejudice and feel secure in 
their position that anyone making such accusations is wrong.[ 1] 
A useful framework for thinking about this kind of flexible definition of wrongdoing is Ariely and 
colleagues' work on dishonesty (e.g., Ariely, [ 2]; Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, [23]). In a substantial series of 
studies with rich behavioral measures, these researchers have reliably induced people to lie and cheat 
for money. They note that very few people cheat for maximum gain even when the threat of detection 
is low, but many people cheat just a little bit. Researchers interpret this finding to mean that there is a 
range of behaviors within which people can adjust their definitions of the behaviors and maintain a 
positive self-concept as moral individuals while there are behaviors that are too extreme to allow for 
this kind of redefinition. As a result, the "small cheaters" still think of themselves as honest and ethical 
people, even as the overall cost of many small cheaters is much higher than that of a few serious 
cheaters. 
In the dishonesty literature, moral dissonance reduction occurs through flexible redefinition of 
unethical behavior in a way that allows the maintenance of a positive self-concept (Barkan, Ayal, Gino, 
& Ariely, [ 3]). By using a self-justifying process to reduce the discomfort of moral dissonance, people 
can develop a "blind spot" in that they are unable to recognize their own unethical behavior. As with 
cognitive dissonance more generally, the individuals distort beliefs about their behavior to minimize 
contradictions between those beliefs and their actions; moral dissonance reduction is specifically about 
reducing contradictions between the unethical action and the moral code (Lowell, [22]; Shu, Gino, & 
Bazerman, [33]). Because the behavior is already in the public record, it is not possible to reduce the 
discrepancy by behaving in a way consistent with moral values, so instead, the individuals must change 
the way they cognitively frame the behavior, for example, by redefining it as acceptable or by adding 
bolstering cognitions to reaffirm their belief in their own moral virtue. 
From the general literature on cognitive dissonance, we know that the self-justifying processes 
motivated by the discomfort of facing inconsistencies in one's thoughts and behavior (Elliot & Devine, 
[10]) occur so quickly as to be unnoticed by the individual. The tendency to engage in dissonance 
reduction gets worse when public judgment is invoked and will often lead people to pile on 
increasingly unlikely explanations and justifications for the original behavior (Festinger, [11]). One of 
the characteristic behaviors of someone engaging in dissonance reduction is their willingness to 
continue to defend the seemingly indefensible, using increasingly implausible arguments rather than 
admit to inconsistency between their actions and values. In moral and ethical domains, a person 
engaging in this kind of self-justification has lost the ability to see her own behavior as problematic; 
although her overall moral codes are intact, she has developed an ethical blind spot that prevents her 
from detecting her own violation of her standards (Sezer, Gino, & Bazerman, [31]). 
As moral dissonance reduction occurs, the definition of dishonest behavior becomes redefined in a 
self-serving way that allows people to feel morally virtuous; though they are being technically 
dishonest, they still feel honest. Indeed, the central feature of dishonest behavior to a person in the 
process of dissonance reduction may well be "something that I wouldn't do." But the ability to self-
justify, to reduce dissonance, is not infinite. Researchers find that the more salient the moral standards 
are, the less likely people are to engage in this flexible redefinition (Mazar et al., [23]); it appears that 
reconnecting people to their moral code makes it harder to justify even minor amounts of cheating. 
Evaluations of immoral acts depend on the social context. Moral dissonance reduction is promoted by 
the idea that the behavior is normative (Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, [13]); thinking about how often other 
people do something increases the likelihood that we judge that action acceptable. At the same time, 
people who recall a dishonest action they have committed without the opportunity to reduce 
dissonance are harsher in condemning the action (Barkan et al., [ 3]). 
We find the similarities between dishonesty and prejudice to be striking. Both behaviors are socially 
condemned, at least in the abstract. Both are related to moral codes. Research on prejudice reduction 
(e.g., Devine, Forscher, Austin, & Cox, [ 6]; Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, [ 7]) argues that 
internalizing a nonprejudiced standard as a central moral value is key to overcoming prejudiced 
responses. Judgments about both categories of behavior—the degree of "wrongness" and the 
likelihood of behavior being excusable—are related to social norms. Social norms play a significant role 
in the expression or inhibition of prejudiced behaviors, particularly among those people for whom 
external social pressures are significant considerations. Such people retain their underlying negative 
beliefs about minority groups and are prone to experiencing backlash, or resurgent expressions of 
negative attitudes, when the social pressure is removed (Plant & Devine, [27]). 
Hypothetically, a wide variety of activities could be considered prejudiced or dishonest, and there is 
some debate about which behaviors don't deserve those labels; people may commit mild versions of 
each kind of behavior in daily living. If lying about a die roll or inflating a test score to get more money 
from an experimenter can be redefined as not-really-dishonest, what would a prejudice blind spot look 
like? By analogy, it would be an action that meets a person's abstract definition of prejudice (judging 
someone based on his group, treating someone badly because of his group), and it would be followed 
by engaging in self-justification to reduce dissonance so that the action does not feel like a moral 
violation to the individual. To be consistent with the dishonesty literature, we would be looking for 
relatively mild behaviors, not maximally prejudiced actions, as this framework implies that there are 
limits to what one can redefine. In a prejudice-relevant context, if moral dissonance reduction occurs, 
we would expect to see it in offensive intergroup behavior for which other explanations are at least 
somewhat plausible. For instance, after making an unfortunate comment that results in charges of 
prejudice, a person may engage in dissonance reduction so quickly that he is certain the comment is 
unobjectionable to all clear-thinking people (because he is a good person, because others have made 
the comment before, because the comment does not reflect who he really is, etc.). 
Dishonesty researchers have argued that when we fail to understand the truenature of dishonesty—
incorrectly assuming that a few "bad apples" are doing most of the harm—we cannot effectively 
combat the problem (Mazar et al., [23]). If moral dissonance reduction does operate in prejudice-
relevant contexts, it may lead to misunderstandings about prejudiced behavior and produce similar 
problems. Self-justification would prevent efforts to reduce prejudice, as people with problematic 
attitudes and behaviors would be confident that they do not need to change. Interventions to improve 
intergroup relations would founder as people redefine their own actions and bolster their confidence 
in their self-image as a person without prejudice. But as these distortions occur, the damage inflicted 
by prejudiced actions would continue unabated. 
The purpose of this set of studies is to investigate the ways in which prejudice can be understood from 
the standpoint of moral dissonance reduction. We propose that in some settings, actions that reflect 
negativity toward members of minority groups can be dismissed by the actor as not problematic, or at 
least evaluated in a way that leaves the actor feeling confident that she is not prejudiced. In the first 
study, we evaluate intergroup behaviors in terms of the degree of wrongness and amount of prejudice 
reflected for our participant population. In the second study, we use behaviors that have some degree 
of ambiguity as to whether they are prejudiced and provide opportunities for self-justification. In the 
third study, we examine the time course of dissonance reduction and make direct comparisons to 
dishonest behavior. 
STUDY 1: EVALUATION OF NEGATIVE INTERGROUP BEHAVIORS 
To assess the way prejudice fits or does not fit the moral dissonance reduction framework, we are 
particularly looking for potential actions that have some ambiguity to them, that may or may not be 
considered prejudiced. Ambiguous behaviors are much more amenable to self-justification, and in 
dishonesty research these kinds of behaviors are prone to ethical blind spots (Pittarello, Leib, Gordon-
Hecker, & Shalvi, [26]). Ideally, the ambiguous behaviors we identify would have the following 
characteristics: (a) They will not be uniformly rated as prejudicial—that is, the perception of these 
behaviors as prejudiced varies for individuals—and (b) they will be systematically correlated with 
individual differences related to moral standards related to nonprejudiced behavior and fairness to 
allow for the possibility of moral dissonance. 
Method 
Participants 
This study comprised 114 Marquette University undergraduate students who participated in exchange 
for partial course credit. The median age was 19 years. Fifty-six percent were female, 42% were male, 
1% identified as nonbinary, and 1% declined to indicate gender. Ninety percent were heterosexual, 
with the remainder split between homosexual and bisexual. Sixty-four percent were White, 13% Asian, 
10% Latinx, 6% African American, and 6% other ethnic identities. 
Materials and procedure 
We provided a list of 25 intergroup behaviors that ranged in intensity from participating in a single-sex 
club to setting fire to a mosque. We varied the targets (race, sex, sexual orientation, disability, religion) 
of the behavior in the statements. We asked participants to rate the behaviors on a scale of 0 (totally 
acceptable) to 100 (totally unacceptable). Participants were also asked to categorize the behaviors into 
three groups (fine, rude/awkward, or prejudiced). The order of the questions was randomized for each 
participant. 
We collected data on two variables that have theoretical relations to prejudice: internal and external 
motivation to control prejudice (Plant & Devine, [27]) and moral foundations (Graham et al., [15]). We 
administered the scales as developed and validated but were primarily interested in three subscales: 
Internal Motivation to Control Prejudice and the moral foundations of Harm and Fairness. 
Internal Motivation to Control Prejudice is central to motivating the prejudice reduction process, so 
items that we seek to use in further studies that are related to participants' nonprejudiced identities 
are strong candidates for behaviors that may induce moral dissonance if committed. This subscale 
consists of five items measured on a 9-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree) and 
had a Cronbach alpha of.87 in the current sample. 
We include the Moral Foundations scale with an eye toward the Harm and Fairness subscales as a way 
of verifying that ambiguously prejudiced violations include moral considerations, and therefore that 
the moral dissonance framework can be appropriately applied to questions of prejudice. Each subscale 
consists of two parts, with three items measured on a 6-point scale, from 1 (not at all relevant) to 
6 (extremely relevant), and three items measured on a 5-point scale, from 1 (strongly disagree) to 
5 (strongly agree). The Harm subscale had a Cronbach's alpha of.65, and the Fairness subscale had a 
Cronbach's alpha of.70 in this sample. 
All surveys were programmed into Qualtrics and completed online in a research laboratory. 
Results 
Average wrongness 
The 25 statements ranged in mean wrongness on the possible scale of 0 to 100 points, from 23.8 
(belonging to a single-sex club or organization) to 99.4 (beating up someone who looks gay). Standard 
deviations were large for all items (> 23 points for all items except the two items nearing the top of the 
Wrongness scale). 
Categorization of behaviors 
The majority of participants agreed on the category—fine, rude or awkward but not prejudiced, 
or definitely prejudiced—of 20 of the 25 items. These items are shown in Figure 1. The remaining five 
items had a plurality, but not majority, in one of the categories and are not included in subsequent 
analyses. 
 
FIGURE 1 Mean wrongness ratings for intergroup behaviors by majority categorization. 
When averaged for each participant, a within-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a 
significant effect for the ratings of wrongness, F( 2, 208) = 232.28, η2 =.69, p <.001. The estimated 
marginal means for all three categories were significantly different from one another at p <.001, using 
the Sidak adjustment for multiple comparisons. The wrongness of the fine items (M = 31.9, SD = 22.8) 
was markedly different from the rude (M = 73.3, SD = 20.4) and prejudiced (M = 78.3, SD = 17.7) items, 
the fine items rated relatively low on the Wrongness scale (averages of 24 to 36 points out of 100) and 
did not overlap at all with the wrongness ratings of the other two categories. The other two categories 
did have some overlap in terms of wrongness despite the overall category ratings being significantly 
different (see Figure 1). For instance, the rude items mocking a person's accent and saying "That's so 
gay," each averaged 80 of 100 points on the Wrongness scale. That was higher than being vigilant 
about safety around Black men (60 points) or being nervous near a Muslim on an airplane (72 points), 
items that were categorized as prejudiced by the majority of participants. 
Relation to individual differences 
We computed average wrongness scores for the preceding three groups of items and examined the 
correlations between the average wrongness ratings and individual differences related to prejudice 
and morality (Table 1).[ 2] The wrongness rating for the items in the fine group did not correlate with 
the individual differences of interest. The average wrongness of the rude and prejudiced items both 
correlated with the moral foundation of fairness; the more important that fairness was to moral 
judgments for an individual, the more wrong they found the behavior. One distinction between 
the rude and prejudiced categories was seen in the relationship to the moral foundation of harm. The 
more an individual considered harm to be a central determinant to judgments about morality, the 
higher the wrongness ratings of the prejudiced items, but this relationship did not hold for 
the rude items. Both categories' wrongness correlated with internal motivation to control prejudice; 
those people who were more motivated to avoid showing prejudice for internalized reasons found the 
items more wrong than those who were less internally motivated. 
TABLE 1 Correlations between Average Wrongness Ratings and Individual Difference Measures for 






Internal Motivation to Control 
Prejudice 
Fine .08 .06 .13 
Rude/Awkward .25** .12 .21* 
Prejudiced .35** .26** .38** 
5 *p < .05. ** p < .01. 
Discussion 
Behaviors with negative intergroup components were interpreted on a continuum in terms of how 
wrong they were and whether they were considered to be clear manifestations of prejudice. Within 
the range of evaluations, however, there was a clear dividing line between those behaviors seen to be 
completely acceptable (fine) and those that were either rude-but-not-prejudiced or definitely 
prejudiced. Evaluations of the moral foundations of fairness and harm, two highly elaborated moral 
codes in Western societies (Graham et al., [15]), were related to judgments of how wrong the behavior 
was. That is, people who are more inclined to use fairness and harm in deciding whether an action is 
acceptable were also inclined to judge the candidate prejudice-relevant actions as more unacceptable. 
The fact that perceived wrongness of the behavior was correlated with internal motivation to control 
prejudice is evidence that this relationship is an important precondition to applying the moral 
dissonance framework to prejudice. In Ariely's ([ 2]) work on dishonesty, one of the factors that 
constrains the redefinition of behavior from dishonest to honest is how much attention people pay to 
standards about honesty. Reminding people of their moral codes related to honesty reduces cheating. 
Here, moral standards are related to our list of intergroup behaviors and motivation to respond 
without prejudice is related to the way people judge the behaviors. 
In the research on moral dissonance and dishonesty, people frequently cheat or lie a little, but very few 
do so for maximum possible gain. Researchers have interpreted this to mean that there are limits to 
how much dishonesty one can commit and still think of oneself as an honest person. Similarly, with 
prejudice, some behaviors appear to be clearly and universally considered prejudice, which would be 
difficult to deliberately engage in and still consider yourself nonprejudiced. As we seek to apply the 
dishonesty framework to prejudice, we suggest that the items in the rude category (e.g., saying "That's 
so gay," mocking someone's accent, or telling a boy he throws like a girl) are behaviors that have the 
potential to be interpreted as prejudiced, depending on the motivation and attitudes of the 
participants. That is, these actions might be areas where prejudice-related self-justification is likely to 
occur. 
STUDY 2: EXPLORING MORAL DISSONANCE REDUCTION IN PREJUDICED 
BEHAVIOR 
We used two findings from dishonesty research to look for a potential prejudice blind spot indicating 
moral dissonance: People are more self-justifying when behavior is considered normative (Gino et al., 
[13]), and less self-justifying—even harsh upon themselves—when reflecting on their own behavior 
without an opportunity to reduce dissonance (Barkan et al., [ 3]). We see self-justifying evaluations as 
being the key to moral dissonance reduction. We therefore asked participants to consider one of our 
items in the rude category from Study 1 in one of two orders: thinking about other people committing 
the behavior and then themselves doing it, or thinking about themselves committing the behavior first 
and then others doing it. According to dishonesty research, people who consider the actions of others 
first should be more prone to self-justification. When thinking about others' behavior first, the 
behavior can be framed as more normative, allowing dissonance reduction to occur. If the same 
pattern holds for our ambiguously prejudiced items, it will provide preliminary evidence that similar 
moral dissonance reduction is taking place. We therefore expect people who consider others' behavior 
first to create room for self-justification that excuses their own behavior, represented by less 
condemnation of the prejudiced acts they themselves commit. We hypothesize that people will rate a 
behavior as worse (containing more prejudice, more morally offensive, and done less often by them 
compared to others) if they think about times they have committed the behavior before thinking about 
times that others have done so than when the order is reversed. 
Method 
Participants 
Ninety-five Marquette University undergraduates completed the study in exchange for partial course 
credit. Seventy percent were female, and 29% were male. The median age was 18 years. Ninety-five 
percent were heterosexual, 2% homosexual, 2% bisexual, and 1% declined to answer. Sixty-five 
percent were White, 13% were Latinx, 10% were Asian, 6% were Black, and 6% identified with other 
ethnic categories. 
Materials and procedure 
We told participants that they would be asked to evaluate behavior that we had previously found to be 
relatively familiar to college students. We asked them to choose one of four possible prompts to 
evaluate based on what seemed most familiar to them. We did not specify whether the behavior 
needed to be something they themselves had done or only witnessed. The order of the choice of 
prompts was randomized for each participant. They could choose (a) telling a boy "You throw like a 
girl," (b) mocking someone's accent, (c) speaking loudly to someone with a non-hearing-related 
disability, or (d) using the phrase "That's so gay" to describe something dumb. Anyone who said she or 
he had never encountered any of these behaviors was routed out of the study. This resulted in the loss 
of one participant. 
We randomly assigned people to one of two orders. Half of the participants were asked to write a brief 
description of their friends or family members doing the behavior and then rated how common this 
behavior was for people in general, using a slidebar with a scale of 0 (very unusual) to 100 (very 
common). Then they were asked to write a brief description of a time they had done the behavior and 
rated how common it was for them personally to act this way using the same slidebar format. Based on 
the moral dissonance framework from research on dishonesty, particularly Gino and colleagues ([13]), 
the salience of others' behavior should promote self-justification in this condition. 
The other 50% of participants, as a control, saw the prompts in reverse order (self, then others). 
Participants were instructed to imagine committing the behavior if they could not recall acting in the 
specified way. All participants then rated the behavior for how much it expressed prejudice, using a 
slidebar from 0 (definitely not) to 100 (definitely), and how wrong the action was, using a slidebar from 
0 (not at all wrong) to 100 (extremely wrong). By first committing to record a report of their own 
violations, there was no opportunity for these participants to adjust their self-reports after considering 
the behavior of others. According to research by Barkan et al. ([ 3]), being forced to confront their own 
bad actions without the chance to excuse it away should have caused these participants less inclined to 
self-justify and more prone to harsh self-judgments. 
After these assessments, participants completed the Moral Foundations scale (Graham et al., [15]) with 
a focus on the subscales related to harm (α =.58) and fairness (α =.62) because of their connection to 
egalitarian rationales for opposing prejudice. Participants were also asked whether they had reported 
on behavior that they personally had committed or that they imagined committing. Finally, they 
provided demographic data and were then routed to a separate extra-credit collector. 
Sixty-three percent of participants chose to respond to the "That's so gay" prompt, 22% to making fun 
of an accent, 12% to telling a boy he throws like a girl, and 3% to speaking loudly to someone with a 
disability. Of all participants, 55% saw the "others first" condition and 45% saw the "self first" 
condition. 
Results 
Because the numbers of people responding to the different prompts were uneven, we ran each 
analysis for all participants and then again for the large subset who responded to the "That's so gay" 
prompt. The results were consistent regardless of the prompt to which they responded, so separate 
analyses of the specific prompts are not presented. 
We computed a self–other gap score for frequency of the behavior, scored so that a positive score 
meant that other people are perceived to engage in the behavior more than the participant. We do not 
consider the ratings an accurate report of how often people really engage in these behaviors, because 
people are generally inaccurate at self-reports of behavior with a social desirability component, 
including behavior related to ethical codes (e.g., Randall & Fernandes, [28]). In this study the size of the 
gap varies by experimental condition, which would be unlikely if the reports were accurate and 
unaffected by the experimental manipulation. Although the actual ratings are not necessarily accurate 
representations of behavior, people's reports of how they compare themselves to other people in 
terms of this negative behavior are interesting. The larger the self–other gap, then, the more the 
participants are claiming that others act this negative way more than they do, the better they look in 
comparison to those others, and therefore the more self-justification is occurring. 
This frequency gap was correlated with participant ratings of how prejudiced the action 
was, r(95) =.27, p =.009, and how wrong the behavior was, r(95) =.31, p =.003. Therefore, we ran a 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with order of target order (self first or others first) as a 
between-subjects variable and self–other frequency gap, amount of prejudice, and wrongness rating as 
dependent variables. The overall MANOVA showed a significant effect of target order, F( 3, 91) = 3.11, 
η2 =.09, p =.03. Follow-up univariate ANOVAs showed that this effect was driven only by the self–other 
gap, F( 1, 93) = 7.40, η2 =.07, p =.008. There was no effect of target order on prejudice ratings, F( 1, 
93) = 0.33, η2 =.004, p =.57, or wrongness ratings, F( 1, 93) = 0.06, η2 =.001, p =.81.[ 3] 
When people thought about others' behavior first—the self-justification condition—the average gap 
was 41.8 points (SD = 24.7); when they thought about their own behavior first, the average gap was 
26.4 points (SD = 30.4). An examination of the mean ratings shows that this effect was driven by 
changes in the estimates for the self. As seen in Figure 2, people estimated the frequency of others' 
behavior similarly when considering others' behavior first (M = 59.5), 95% confidence interval (CI) 
[53.7, 65.2], and when considering their own behavior first (M = 55.0), 95% CI [48.7, 61.3]. In contrast, 
their reports of their own behavior changed depending on whether they made those reports before or 
after thinking about others' behavior. Those who considered others' behavior before their own gave 
lower estimates of frequency for their own behavior (M = 17.7), 95% CI [10.8, 24.5], than those who 
started by thinking of their own behavior (M = 28.6), 95% CI [21.0, 36.1]. 
 
FIGURE 2 Mean frequency ratings for others' and own behavior by question order. 
Relation to individual differences 
As with Study 1, evaluations of these behaviors were related to moral reasoning related to harm and 
fairness. The self–other gap, an indication of self-justification, was correlated with the Moral 
Foundations/Harm scale, r(95) =.27, p =.009, as well as the Moral Foundations/Fairness 
scale, r(95) =.33, p =.001, although given the low reliability of the subscales in this sample, these results 
should be viewed with caution.[ 4] The self–other gap was also correlated with how much prejudice 
people saw in the action, r(95) =.27, p =.009, and how wrong they thought the action 
was, r(95) =.30, p =.003. Thus the more a person viewed fairness and harm as key moral principles, the 
more prejudiced and wrong they judged the behavior, and the bigger the gap between how often they 
said they did it and how often others did it. 
These correlations differed depending on the order of questions asked (self vs. others first; see Table 
2). For participants who considered the behavior from the perspective of others first, in the self-
justifying condition, the self–other gap was correlated with the Moral Foundations/Harm subscale, the 
amount of prejudice seen in the action, and the wrongness of the action. The correlation between the 
self–other gap and the Moral Foundations/Fairness scale was not significant. In contrast, for 
participants who considered their own behavior before that of others—who are predicted to be in a 
more self-critical state about their own behavior—the correlation between the self–other gap and the 
Moral Foundations/Fairness scale was significant, but the correlations between the gap and moral 
foundations/harm and wrongness of the action were nonsignificant. 
TABLE 2 Correlations between the Self–Other Gap and Individual Differences by Order of Questions 
 
Others First (Self-Serving)a Self First (Self-Critical)b 
Moral foundations/Fairness .18 .36* 
Moral foundations/Harm .36** .16 
Prejudice in action .30* .29 
Wrongness of action .47*** .15 
a df = 52. 
b df = 43. 
c *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
Discussion 
As predicted from the dishonesty framework, social norms influenced the way people thought about a 
potentially prejudiced behavior. More self-justification occurred when people considered what others 
did first, consistent with previous research that others' behavior changes the salience of social norms 
(Gino et al., [13]). Participants in this study felt that others did the objectionable behavior more than 
they did across the board, consistent with the general self-serving bias (Kruger & Dunning, [20]). But 
when they thought about those others before thinking about their own behavior, they reported that 
they did these offensive actions less often than when they hadn't thought first about the actions of 
others (i.e., reflected on social norms). Because these order effects occurred based on random 
assignment, it is not plausible that the lower reports of own-frequency were accurate descriptions of 
group differences in behavior. 
Explicit judgments of prejudice and wrongness were related to moral principles of fairness and harm. It 
might be argued that the correlations between the self–other gap and individual differences do not 
represent self-justification, and people who see the behavior as prejudiced also actually do it less, but 
as previously noted, in that case the differences in reported frequency by order condition are hard to 
interpret. The patterns of relationships with the individual differences suggest that shifts in thinking 
about a specific prejudiced behavior, either in the direction of self-justification or in the direction of 
self-criticism, changes the matrix of beliefs about morality that a participant will report. 
Although self-reports of frequency of negative behavior changed as social norms were made more or 
less salient, explicit judgments of the prejudice and wrongness of the behavior did not. It is difficult to 
interpret this finding in light of the dishonesty moral dissonance reduction framework, as to our 
knowledge participants in dishonesty studies are not asked how dishonest or wrong a behavior is. The 
lack of shift in explicit evaluations of prejudice and wrongness that we predicted in this study raise 
several possibilities: (a) moral dissonance reduction works differently for prejudice than dishonesty; (b) 
for both prejudice and dishonesty, people don't shift conscious evaluations of behavior when 
maintaining their self-concept—it happens at an unconscious level; (c) for both prejudice and 
dishonesty, people don't shift evaluations of behavior at all—behavioral data from dishonesty research 
may not reflect a change in the explicit definition of whether an action is dishonest; or (d) the self-
serving estimation of frequency in this study reduced moral dissonance, and therefore participants had 
no need to further adjust their thinking in subsequent questions to maintain a positive self-concept. 
The goal of the final study is to tease apart these possibilities. 
STUDY 3: COMPARING PREJUDICE AND DISHONESTY 
In this study, we introduced two additional variables: a direct comparison between prejudice and 
dishonesty and the order in which reports of the frequency of behavior and the amount of 
prejudice/dishonesty in the behavior are measured. We were particularly interested in whether 
participants would demonstrate self-justifying evaluations at the first available opportunity after 
thinking about the immoral behavior, and whether this tendency would be different for prejudice than 
for dishonesty. In Study 2, people's estimates of how frequently they engaged in a behavior changed 
depending on whether they evaluated themselves or other first, but evaluations of how wrong the 
behavior was or how much prejudice it represented—questions asked after the frequency estimates—
did not change. It is possible that this pattern reflects the content of the questions and that people 
respond to frequency estimates differently than other kinds of judgments. Another possibility is that 
the shift in ratings for frequency occurred simply because it was the first question encountered, and if 
dissonance could be reduced by giving a self-justifying estimate frequency, there was no need to 
further reduce dissonance by saying the actions were not that bad. In the current study we varied the 
content of the first question asked to test for this possibility and predicted that more self-justifying 
evaluations would occur in the first question asked, regardless of the content of the question. 
Method 
Participants 
There were 301 Marquette University students who completed the study. The median age was 
19 years. Seventy-seven percent were female, and 23% were male. Ninety-five percent were 
heterosexual, 2% homosexual, 2% bisexual, and 1% uncertain or preferred not to say. Seventy-three 
percent were White, 11% Asian, 7% Latinx, 3% Black, 3% biracial, less than 1% other, and 2% declined 
to answer their ethnicity. 
Materials and procedure 
This study, conducted via Qualtrics.com, was a three-way between-subjects design, manipulating the 
type of behavior (prejudice or dishonesty), the target order (self first or others first), and the question 
order (frequency of behavior first, or how prejudiced/dishonest the behavior was first). The last 
variable was intended to test whether participants' evaluations change in the first question asked, 
regardless of the topic of that question. We also asked how wrong the behavior was, though the order 
of this question remained constant as a control. As in Study 2, evaluations of behavior were made on a 
slidebar from 0 to 100, where a higher score indicated more frequency, more prejudice/dishonesty, 
and more wrongness. We used the behavior most frequently recognized by participants in Study 3, 
using the phrase "That's so gay" to refer to something dumb, as the example of potentially prejudiced 
behavior, and the example of sharing answers on an academic assignment as the example of dishonest 
behavior. 
We included a measure of moral self-concept taken from the dishonesty literature, although it should 
be noted that these authors (Mazar et al., [23]) predicted no differences in moral self-concept because 
of "self-concept maintenance." They measured self-concept maintenance by asking two questions 
within a battery of 10 that related to dishonesty: How honest are you (absolute scale = 0–100), and 
compared to other people, how moral are you (scale of 1–9, with 9 = much more honest than other 
people). We added a question of how fair you are in interactions with other people using the same 
scale as the honesty question. We also included the Moral Foundations scale (Graham et al., [15]), with 
our interest again focused on the Harm (α =.59) and Fairness (α =.61) subscales. 
Results 
In contrast to Study 2, in this study there was evidence of self-selection. People were more likely to 
stop completing the study or leave answers blank when asked about their own behavior first (31.1%) 
than when asked about others' behavior first (9.4%), χ2 ( 1) = 28.53, p <.001. Attrition did not differ for 
the two topics of prejudice and dishonesty, χ2 ( 1) = 3.52, p =.06. 
For the participants who completed the study, we computed self–other gaps for frequency of behavior, 
amount of prejudice or dishonesty reflected in the behavior (violation), and wrongness of the behavior. 
The potential range of each gap was −100 to 100. Gaps were scored in each case so that a higher score 
is more self-justifying, that is, 
• Self–other gap for frequency: Positive score means other people do it more than I do; 
• Self–other gap for violation: Positive score means it is more dishonest or prejudiced when 
others do it than when I do it; and 
• Self–other gap for how wrong the action is: Positive scores means it is more wrong when others 
do it than when I do it. 
We conducted a three-way between-subjects MANOVA with target order, question order, and topic as 
between-subject factors and frequency, violation, and wrongness gaps as dependent measures. In 
support of the argument that perceptions of prejudice and dishonesty operate similarly, there was no 
main effect for the topic of the question, F( 3, 239) = 1.65, η2 =.02, p =.18, nor were there any 
significant interactions involving topic. For these measures, prejudice and dishonesty evoked similar 
responses in participants. 
There was a significant overall main effect for target order, F( 3, 239) = 3.26, η2 =.04, p =.022, as in 
Study 2. However, the main effect is not as theoretically interesting as the Question Order × Target 
Order interaction. For this interaction, the dissonance reduction hypothesis predicts that people will be 
more lenient in evaluating their own behavior when thinking of others' behavior before their own and 
that this effect will be biggest for the question asked first, as participants reduce dissonance at the first 
opportunity, though these results need to be interpreted in light of the unexpected differences in self-
selection in different conditions. In the overall MANOVA there was a significant Target Order × 
Question Order interaction, F( 3, 239) = 3.10, η2 =.04, p =.028. Follow-up ANOVAs show that this effect 
was driven by only the violation ratings, F( 1, 241) = 8.20, η2 =.03, p =.005. When we asked the violation 
question first, the difference between the others-first gap and the self-first gap was considerably larger 
and in the predicted direction (13.0 vs. 0.4) compared to when this question was asked after the 
frequency question (6.5 vs. 10.0; Figure 3). 
 
FIGURE 3 Self–other gap for violation ratings by question order. 
We repeated these analyses for only those participants who said they were reporting on remembered 
(cf. imagined) behavior, and the results did not change. When participants first were asked about how 
much the behavior violates moral standards, their answers differed depending on the order of focusing 
on self or others first: When they were first asked about others, they judge the behavior as more 
violating when shown by others than when shown by themselves. When they were first asked about 
themselves, no differences in moral judgments appear between judging others and judging 
themselves. Seventy-two percent of people said they were reporting remembered behavior, although 
again this value should be interpreted in light of the initial self-selection. 
Self-concept 
We conducted a three-way between-subjects MANOVA with topic, question order, and target order as 
between-subject factors and participant self-rating of honesty, fairness, and ethical standards as 
dependent measures. If self-concept maintenance were not taking place, we would expect a topic main 
effect; people who reflected on their dishonest actions should self-rate lower on honesty and ethics, 
and people who reflected on their prejudiced actions should self-rate lower on fairness. The MANOVA 
revealed no significant effect for topic, F( 3, 290) = 0.44, η2 =.005, p =.72, nor were there other 
significant effects in this analysis, consistent with patterns in the dishonesty literature. 
Moral foundations 
The self–other gap for how frequent the behavior (across orders) was correlated with the Moral 
Foundations/Harm subscale, r(268) =.13, p =.039. As with Study 2, when the frequency question was 
asked first, the correlation between harm beliefs and the self–other gap for frequency was larger than 
in the overall data set, r(133) =.22, p =.01. When the violation question was asked first, the correlation 
was not significant, r(135) =.04, p =.67. Although, as in Study 2, the reliability of the subscales was 
lower than we would have liked, the consistency in the relationship between moral foundations and 
question order across studies in the similar condition but not in the divergent condition helps make 
sense of the Study 2 findings. Self-justifying estimates about how often people commit a behavior was 
associated with more concerned about harming others as a moral issue, but only when the question 
about frequency was asked first. For participants for whom another question intervened between 
reflection on the behavior and their reports of frequency, the association between frequency and 
concern about harm was not present. 
In contrast to Study 2, The self–other gap in frequency was not correlated with the Moral 
Foundations/Fairness subscale, r(268) =.06, p =.31. There were no significant correlations between this 
subscale and the self–other gap in frequency for either order condition.[ 5] 
Discussion 
The goal of this study was to evaluate rival interpretations of Study 2 results. We can, from these data, 
reject the premise that people do not shift evaluations of behavior, because the explicit evaluations of 
how much dishonesty or prejudice was reflected in the actions shifted in different conditions. We can 
tentatively reject the idea that prejudice and dishonesty are dissimilar in terms of moral dissonance 
reduction, at least as far as we had the opportunity to evaluate them here; in every case where it was 
possible for topic differences to emerge, none did. That leaves as the most likely candidate the 
hypothesis that self-justification through lower estimation of frequency in Study 2 reduced moral 
dissonance, and therefore participants had no need to further shift their evaluations of behavior to 
maintain a positive self-concept. 
The attrition rate in the frequency-first condition in this study was a surprise and in retrospect may 
suggest that the selection of one of several prompts in the previous study created elements of a forced 
compliance cognitive dissonance design. That is, in Study 2, by choosing a prompt as most familiar, 
participants may have felt more obligated to answer questions about it than when we removed that 
free choice, even if the subsequent prompt was identical. It is impossible to know with certainty the 
reasons for the attrition, but its nonrandom distribution suggests that something about answering 
questions regarding the frequency of personally engaging in mild prejudice was uncomfortable enough 
to cause significant numbers of people to cease their participation in the study. In the dishonesty 
literature (Shu, Mazar, Gino, Ariely, & Bazerman, [34]), signing a form prior to completing it decreased 
dishonesty in self-reporting by calling to mind ethical standards. Although the presentation of the 
frequency question was not the same as signing one's name to a form and pledging honest responses, 
if answering the question about one's own behavior frequency also called to mind moral standards, 
such salience could have increased dissonance and motivated people to opt out of the study as a way 
of reducing the salience of the experienced dissonance. 
When looking at the participant evaluations of how much prejudice or dishonesty the behavior 
contained, we saw that answers depended on the order in which the questions were asked and that 
when the question was asked immediately after considering the behavior, ratings were consistent with 
the dissonance reduction hypothesis. That is, when this set of questions was the first thing people 
encountered after thinking about the behavior, on average they considered the behavior less dishonest 
or prejudiced if they thought about others' behavior before their own, allowing them to see the 
behavior as more normative. Thinking about their own behavior without that normative context made 
their evaluations harsher, as seen in studies of moral dissonance and dishonesty. In contrast, when 
people had the opportunity to answer other questions between thinking about the behavior and 
reporting on their own and others' commission of the behavior, there was not an order effect for the 
evaluation of how much prejudice or dishonesty the behavior reflected. The fact that the self-justifying 
evaluation of behavior disappears when other questions intervene between the prompt and the 
evaluation helps to explain the findings in Study 2 and is consistent with the idea that people are using 
their first responses to offload dissonance. If this is the case, there is no longer a need to self-justify 
when the questions come later in the sequence. 
Dishonesty researchers attribute a lack of change in self-concept after cheating to self-concept 
maintenance (Mazar et al., [23]). Null results can be a challenge to interpret, but we see here that the 
two topics of prejudice and dishonesty did not differ in the participants' self-concepts after 
contemplating these actions, so at a minimum the findings here are consistent with published work 
self-concept maintenance and moral dissonance related to dishonesty. 
In this study, the Study 2 correlation between the moral foundation of fairness and self-serving 
evaluations of frequency of behavior did not replicate. In Study 2 this correlation was strongest among 
those who reported the frequency of their own behavior first, which was the same group in this study 
that had the highest attrition rate. However, the connection between the moral foundation of harm 
and self-justifying reports of the frequency of behavior did replicate. There was a strong association 
between being concerned with harming others and being self-justifying in reporting how often one 
engaged in moderately unethical behavior. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Overall, in this set of studies, we see patterns of evidence suggesting that the moral dissonance 
framework may be useful in understanding self-justification of some prejudiced behavior. The 
argument that self-justifying personal dishonesty is motivated by a desire to reduce moral dissonance, 
as opposed to a more general cognitive dissonance reduction desire or other processes, is based on 
the idea that dishonesty is considered by many people to be an immoral act. That claim is bolstered by 
evidence that reminders of moral codes decrease the dishonesty being studied. Those moral codes 
may be about the specific behavior in question (honor codes when the behavior studied is cheating) or 
more general (recalling the Ten Commandments, which reduced cheating even among the nonreligious 
and those who recalled them incorrectly). 
The analogous idea that prejudice can be reduced through making values salient has been around for 
nearly 50 years (Rokeach, [29]). Here, we looked at the association between specific moral foundations 
and reactions to behaviors in general and at the association between moral foundations and people's 
evaluations of their own acts. Correlations indicate that there is a relationship between how people 
think about morality, specifically related to themes of harm and fairness, and how they evaluate 
prejudice. In addition, the internal motivation to control the expression of prejudice, which requires 
making nonprejudiced values central to one's identity, is related to the evaluation of intergroup 
behaviors. For those who wish to believe themselves nonprejudiced, data from these studies, as well 
as from the larger literature, suggest that failure to live up to their own standards can be considered a 
moral issue. 
Not surprisingly, there is a range of opinion on behaviors that have some negative intergroup 
components that could be perceived as prejudiced, and such ambiguity opens the door for self-concept 
maintenance. Although we would not expect dishonesty-style self-justification for the most extreme 
behaviors examined in Study 1, such as physical assault based on group membership, it is possible that 
microaggressions and other negative actions with plausible alternative explanations may allow for this 
kind of redefinition. People asked about the ambiguous behaviors show evidence of dissonance 
reduction in terms of their willingness to admit engaging in such behavior (Study 2) and their 
evaluations of its harmfulness (Study 3). They seem to reduce dissonance at the first available 
opportunity. Consistent with dishonesty research, we saw no explicit change in self-concept after the 
opportunity for dissonance reduction. As suggested by Shalvi, Gino, Barkan, and Ayal ([32]), dissonance 
reduction after a threat to one's moral self-concept is likely to occur through compensatory thoughts 
that reduce the degree of violation, such as the idea that other people act in worse ways. 
Moral dissonance reduction related to prejudice poses a challenge for improving intergroup relations. 
The human capacity for self-serving justification is impressive, and the maintenance of a positive self-
concept reduces the chances that people will view their behavior as problematic. Even when behavior 
causes problems for others, our ability to flexibly define our behavior as morally acceptable eliminates 
the motive to improve that behavior. To act intentionally to break the bad habit of prejudiced 
responses first requires one to recognize that one's actions are prejudicial in nature, whether 
intentional or not (Devine et al., [ 6], [ 7]); it is impossible to break a habit of which one is unaware. 
However, dissonance reduction has at its root a process that will prevent such recognition. Instead of 
mindfully seeking ways to change their own reactions, people engaged in dissonance reduction will, if 
pressed, simply layer on increasingly intense, less logical, justifications for the initial behavior. Such 
deceptive responses are not only designed to mislead others in order to protect their own reputations; 
these acts of dissonance reduction are also designed to self-deceive in order to maintain positive self-
concepts (Chance, Norton, Gino, & Ariely, [ 5]). 
Moral dissonance reduction further complicates the process of prejudice reduction by circumventing 
the necessary step of internalizing a nonprejudiced standard. Those who believe through self-
justification that they are blameless in any intergroup conflict are unlikely to feel it necessary to pledge 
to work on becoming less prejudiced. Self-concept maintenance will therefore prevent accurate self-
assessment, and where conflicts arise, people are more likely to look outward for the source of the 
problem rather than inward. Ms. Smith, the politician described at the beginning of this article, argued 
that charges of prejudice were the result of shadowy forces opposing her candidacy to the village 
board rather than admit it was probably a bad idea to use the "n-word" while running for public office 
in a mixed-race neighborhood. She had not publicly given any signs of self-reflection or remorse, and 
indeed in her claims of being colorblind she has likely immunized herself from feeling the need to 
reduce her own prejudice while creating an impression in the minds of most observers that she is, in 
fact, biased (see Apfelbaum, Sommers, & Norton, [ 1]). 
Those who believe that they are personally objective in their judgments of others, and not swayed by 
concepts like race or gender, show higher levels of discriminatory behavior (Uhlmann & Cohen, [37]). 
For such individuals, the potential for future change is reduced because those in the grip of dissonance 
reduction are not able to accurately predict what they will do the next time a similar circumstance 
arises (Chance et al., [ 5]). The blind spot created by this sort of ethical dissonance reduction in one 
instance has the potential to become the basis for self-justification in the future. In this cycle of self-
justification, a person may become willing and able to justify increasingly biased and overt behavior. 
Within groups, moral dissonance reduction may increase problematic behavior. Dishonesty researchers 
have found that the salience and social acceptability of unethical behavior, signaled by the actions of 
others, increases an individual's willingness to act unethically (Gino et al., [13]). To the degree that 
similar processes are operating for prejudice, any biased comment or action makes it easier for an 
observer to engage in the same kind of bias without compunction. This effect is particularly strong 
when the observer identifies with or feels psychologically close to the actor (Gino & Galinsky, [14]). 
Writing about moral dissonance more generally, but in a way certainly applicable to bias-related 
dissonance reduction, Lowell ([22]) observed that dissonance reduction "can create an amplifying 
feedback loop and downward spiral of immoral behavior" (p. 17). 
Conversely, research on hypocrisy and dissonance suggests that making people aware of the 
discrepancies between their behavior and their professed views may assist in motivating behavioral 
change (Stone & Focella, [36]). Assuming that dissonance cannot be conveniently offloaded by some of 
the processes seen in dishonesty research, hypocrisy creates a threat to the self-integrity of the 
individual and motivates them to look for ways to avoid such threats in the future. It is even 
hypothesized that vicarious hypocrisy, seeing someone else's behavior that is inconsistent with 
professed beliefs, may serve the same motivational function to the degree that the observer shares an 
ingroup identity with the observed actor (Focella, Stone, Fernandez, Cooper, & Hogg, [12]). The key 
issue in applying these ideas to reduce prejudice is how to prevent people from reducing dissonance 
on their own so that the motivation to do better remains salient. 
One dimension on which dishonesty and prejudice may diverge is the goal behind dissonance 
reduction. The goal of self-justification of dishonesty is to maximize profit while not suffering damage 
to the self-concept as an honest person (Mazar et al., [23]). Given the social stigma incurred by being 
labeled as prejudiced, it is likely that self-concept maintenance will be invoked when a person needs to 
defend the self-concept from accusations of prejudiced behavior, but it isn't clear from these studies 
what the motive of the expression of prejudice is. What is the prejudice-relevant analogy to 
maximizing profit in dishonesty research? One possibility is that the expression of prejudiced views 
may be a way to affirm one's social identity among groups where the views are normative, even if 
larger society considers the views to be prejudiced (Klein, Licata, Assi, & Durala, [19]). Although the 
idea of moral dissonance reduction does not require a specific motivation other than reducing 
consequences of inconsistency with one's moral values, further examination of the motives involved in 
prejudice-related self-justification would be useful in discovering ways to circumvent this process. 
We will not claim that the moral dissonance framework is suitable for understanding every negative 
intergroup action that occurs. We do argue, however, that both practically and theoretically it calls for 
further inquiry. The degree to which people can harm or insult others without adjusting their moral 
self-concept is a dangerous insulator against self-awareness, growth, and more positive intergroup 
relations. 
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Footnotes 
1 As indeed was Ms. Smith. When the story quoted here ran online, Ms. Smith posted a public 
comment, not disputing any of the quotations, but saying to the reporter, "After our talk this is 
the conversation you want to impart? ... Obviously, there are powers that be in this Village that 
DO NOT want me in Government. Mr. Wehner you had an opportunity to have a real 
conversation with the public. To make a difference. To bring together. To rise above hate and to 
inform" (Wehner, [38]). How using racial slurs was rising above hate was not evident in her 
comments. 
2 The remaining subscales, as predicted, were not significantly correlated with the wrongness ratings 
of the fine, rude, and prejudiced items. Correlation coefficients for external motivation to 
control prejudice were −.11,.04, and −.08, respectively. For the moral foundation of loyalty, 
coefficients were −.15, −.18, and −.14; for authority, −.16, −.07, and −.16; for purity, −.08, −.17, 
−.14. 
3 We also ran this analysis just with people who were reporting on the behavior that they remembered 
doing, rather than those who said in the manipulation check that they were imagining that they 
did the behavior. The results were the same: a significant only effect for target order, F(1, 
60) = 6.40, p = .014, driven by changes in reports of their own behaviors. 
4 The self–other gap was uncorrelated with moral foundations of loyalty (r = .04, p = .73), authority 
(r = .10, p = .40), or purity (r = −.004, p = .97). 
5 As expected, the remaining three Moral Foundations subscales were uncorrelated with the self–
other gap for frequency. The gap was uncorrelated with loyalty (r = .05, p = .40), authority 
(r = .06, p = .32), or purity (r = .03, p = .66) in the overall data set, and no correlations emerged 
as significant when looking by order condition. 
6 Color versions of one or more of the figures in the article can be found online 
at www.tandfonline.com/hebh. 
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